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Abstract
The controversial state-sponsored family planning program officially
began in South Africa in 1974. Although the government did not implement the program on a racial basis, the program was widely believed to be
linked with white fears of growing black numbers, and was attacked by
detractors as a program of social and political control. In spite of the hostile environment, black women’s use of services steadily increased. Using
historical and anthropological evidence, this paper delineates the links between the social and political context of racial domination and individual
fertility behavior. It argues that the quantitative success of the family planning program is rooted in profound social and economic shifts conditioning reproductive authority and fertility decisionmaking. The analysis traces
tensions over reproductive control within and across three different arenas:
the evolution of national politics of population; the transformation of gender relations within a racially discriminatory society; and the proscriptions
of everyday life for black women. State policies of racial segregation and
influx control, ethnic “homeland” politics, and male labor migration transformed opportunities and constraints for black women and men, and altered local and household expectations of childbearing. Women came to
manage their own fertility as they increasingly found themselves in precarious social and economic circumstances.

This material may not be reproduced in any form without written permission
from the author.

The state-sponsored family planning program officially began in South
Africa in 1974 in the midst of rising black unemployment, rapid black urbanization, and increasing militancy against the regime. The government
promoted family planning services as a measure to improve the health of
women and their children; it also acknowledged the program was a way to
place a check on the high growth rate burdening limited resources. The government did not implement the program on a racial basis, services were provided free to any woman who sought them; however, the links between the
family planning program and white fears of growing black numbers were
widely acknowledged. Reports of forced sterilization and coerced contraceptive use furthered the suspicions of the program as a manifestation of
another apartheid policy aimed at controlling the lives of blacks. Controversy quickly ensued. Accusations were lodged against family planning as a
dubious program of control with genocidal undertones while supporters waxed
rhetorical about an imminent population explosion that demanded immediate and decisive action by the government. Although the political climate
surrounding fertility control had been at best hostile prior to the early 1990s,
the program had been successful in several dimensions. Use of family planning services had increased continuously since 1974 (see Figure 1); current
use of modern contraceptives had achieved a remarkably high level, estimated to have reached 44 percent for African women1 in the late 1980s; and
the total fertility rates (TFR) across all population groups continued to decline (see Figure 2) for Africans in the late 1980s, the TFR was estimated to
have dropped to 4.6 children per woman of reproductive age, the lowest in
sub-Saharan Africa at that time.2 Whereas politics evidently did not cause a
stagnation in family planning use, the numbers documenting the trends toward lowered fertility beg the question of how the larger sociopolitical context of racial domination inhibited or encouraged reproductive control. How

Figure 1 Average number of women protected per month, South
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can it be that family planning was at once not politically viable yet highly
successful?
Academic isolation and the politicization of family planning in the
country severely curtailed investigation into reproductive dynamics. The few
researchers that did venture into South African population policy emphasized the state’s role, outlining the suspect nature of the family planning
program as a component of the white government’s agenda to control the
nonwhite population (Brown, 1983 and 1987; Chimere-Dan, 1993; Klugman,
1993). While state-focused approaches are useful as a critique of the program and of the government under which it operated, they offer few insights
into why so many women sought the program’s services. A different approach is taken by Caldwell and Caldwell (1993). They construct their argument not in terms of the state’s manipulation of population policy, but around
fertility and contraceptive prevalence patterns in the country. They assert
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Figure 2 Estimated total fertility rate by population group, South
Africa, 1945–89
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that given the level of socioeconomic development in the country and the
level of financing enjoyed by the national family planning program, South
Africa’s fertility is not as low, and contraceptive use levels are not as high,
especially among blacks, as might be expected. Caldwell and Caldwell are
concerned with why women and their partners have not controlled their fertility more than they have. They suggest three factors that may have acted to
inhibit fertility decline: (1) the pronatalist practices or beliefs specific to the
indigenous cultures of the area; (2) suspicion of the family planning program; and (3) the disincentives to lower fertility inherent in apartheid policies. Their review of the literature illustrating these points offers tantalizing
insights into some of the pressures and expectations of childbearing in South
Africa, but it skirts the issue of why so many have opted for fewer children.
Indeed, the issues Caldwell and Caldwell proffer as explanations for what
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they interpret as a laggard decline in fertility could easily be inverted: Given
the adverse political conditions or an adherence to pronatalist traditional practices, why has fertility declined as much as it has?
Whether the patterns of reproductive behavior have reached levels
above or below expectation are two sides of a larger question: What have
been the tensions produced by the political climate surrounding fertility dynamics in South Africa, and how has the manifestation of those tensions in
women’s lives affected their decision to control their fertility? This paper
proposes that there have been dramatic shifts in social and economic opportunities and constraints in women’s lives, and that with these shifts, personal, familial, and community expectations of childbearing also have undergone profound change. The vigorous but politically compromised family
planning program facilitated women’s control over their fertility in the context of that uncertainty.
This paper delineates the relationship between political context and
individual fertility behavior in South Africa. The first part of the argument
presents the history of reproductive control in the country, a history proscribed by racially based population policies on the one hand, and a transformation of gender relationships on the other. The second part considers the
confluence of these forces at the community level, where the politics of suspicion toward family planning were manifest. The program was perceived
by many blacks as a symbol of racial domination, and these attitudes were
supported by widespread reports of abuse, misinformation, and coercion,
compounding the social and personal cost of contraceptive use. The third
section focuses on reproductive control from women’s perspective. It details
the way women managed their productive and reproductive lives in the con-
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text of gendered tensions over childbearing and rearing, community and familial expectations of their fertility, and social and economic uncertainty.
The paper concludes by considering recent developments in family planning
and reproductive health and prospects for further transformation. The arguments presented below are primarily concerned with the intersection of the
politics of population policies and the responses by and consequences for
Africans, who constitute about 75 percent of the population. The variations
in effect of these policies across other racial groups is equally interesting but
beyond the scope of this paper.

RACE AND POPULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: HISTORICAL
ROOTS OF POLICY AND PROGRAMS
The history of reproductive control and family planning in South Africa is tightly bound with the policies and laws that entrenched social and
economic inequality by race. Family planning services were available as
early as the 1930s in South Africa through beneficient welfare societies, but
these were intended to cater to poor whites; services at that time were considered appropriate only for the “improvement” of the white race, not as a
means to curb population growth. Instead, early population concerns rested
squarely with population distribution: “superfluous natives,” those not working for white industry or households, should be prohibited from entering
“white” cities. Greater black presence in cities was of deep concern to the
white population and may have served to expedite more aggressive reserve
laws. In 1936, the Representation of Natives Act designated that 13 percent
of the land in South Africa be set aside for Africans.3 This important piece of

7

legislation, on which homeland policy in future years would be built, appeared to resolve simultaneously two pressing dimensions of the “native
question”: “Excess Africans” could be removed from white cities to “their
own” land; and these African areas then also could become centers for cheap
available labor, quite literally reserves of labor to be channeled as necessary
to white farms, industry, or mines (Kaufman, 1996).
The victory of the Nationalist Party on the apartheid platform in 1948
did not initially mark a departure from these population priorities. Both legislation and public rhetoric promoted large, healthy white families, encouraged white immigration, and discouraged black migration to the cities, except under stringent conditions of employment (Brown, 1983 and 1987;
Chimere-Dan, 1993). The apartheid government’s primary concern was still
centered on the distribution of Africans as opposed to their overall numbers.
This sentiment is perhaps best captured by H.F. Verwoerd, considered the
architect of apartheid, when he spoke to Parliament in 1965 (cited in Caldwell,
1970: 67): “I want to state very clearly that, whilst I am in favour of a reduction of the number of Bantu in our white areas, I need not be concerned that
their presence, or even an increase in their numbers, accounts an actual violation of our policy. In terms of our policy even increasing numbers still
constitute no danger.” Such obstinacy was not long-lived, and increasing
population size did become a concern. In the meantime, however, the reserve policy was elaborated and entrenched under the rubric of “separate
development.” This ideology, underwritten by racial and ethnic separatism
and a daunting labor migration system, became a key element in the politics
of population issues, molding the parameters of reproductive control and
fertility decisionmaking at the political and personal levels.
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Separate development grew out of a political concern to appease the
segregationist and assimilationist positions on the “native question.” The
anthropological notion of culture found its way into the political vernacular
as a legitimizing concept framing separatist policies although acknowledging the potential of Africans to develop (Dubow, 1987). Instead of focusing
on racial differences and the attendant physical distinctions thought to correspond to those categories, the government imposed ethnic denominations,
ostensibly based on home language, with an intention to group culturally
homogenous people. Drawing on the idea that “tribes” were uniquely different and culturally distinct, the strategy of separate development, formalized
during the 1960s, was built on the premise that racial and ethnic groups
should develop independently and at their own pace. The government designated areas for each group in which to reside; the Republic of South Africa
(RSA) was designated as the white area and segregated residential areas
within it were set aside for whites, coloreds, and Indians, and for properly
documented blacks. Ten ethnic homelands, or bantustans, were set aside for
Africans. These were no longer simply black reserves, but “tribal” areas that
could one day become independent countries.4 All Africans were assigned to
their “appropriate” homeland (whether or not they had any kin ties there),
and only documented workers were allowed as “guests” in white areas. Separate development not only furthered the pre-1948 reserve and labor policies,
but seemed to provide an answer to the problem of a growing and less pliable black population: It fostered ethnic divisions within the black population; it released the Republic of South Africa from its responsibility for Africans because homeland residents would come to forfeit South African
citizenship; and it placed whites in a more favorable position in the numbers
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game because they would not be compared numerically to a whole African
population, but to ethnic subpopulations. The ideology also precipitated urban removal programs that grew in intensity throughout the 1960s and 1970s
through which many Africans from “black spots” were resettled with or without their consent to the homelands (Platzky and Walker, 1985).
Separate development was the embodiment of the white public desire
to rid white areas of “superfluous” blacks, but even as it was implemented,
the realization soon developed that cordoning them off in homelands was
not sufficient. White faith began to falter that ethnic homelands would somehow stem the growth of a burgeoning African population, diffuse the political potential of their numbers, or reduce the drain on (white) resources. As
reflected in official census numbers, Figures 3 and 4 show that, not surprisingly, the urban black population continued to grow as did the overall population.5 Although the homelands did not contain African population growth in
urban or rural areas, as a strategy for controlling and regulating African mobility
and labor, the homeland system was, in fact, fairly successful, with two important consequences for fertility control: First, the prolonged absence of men placed
severe constraints on family building, reproductive decisionmaking, and family
maintenance as women were left to fend for themselves and their children. Second, the set of rights accorded homelands as a part of their progress toward
independence also had a direct impact on family planning service provision.
Both of these points are detailed in later sections.
As concern over population issues moved beyond urban white–black
ratios to include overall differential population growth trajectories, the government reluctantly moved toward a national family planning program. For
many years, the government insisted officially that Africans were not sufficiently developed to accept family planning or that family planning was not
10

Figure 3 Urban population by race, South Africa, 1904–91
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culturally acceptable. Unofficially, it wished to avoid the political outrage
that family planning, easily interpreted as a racially motivated plan, might
engender. This concern was not ill-founded, as policymakers had in hand
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numerous examples of prominent leaders provoking controversy. In 1967,
Minister of Bantu Affairs Botha appealed to every white couple to have an
extra child for the nation (an appeal known as the “Baby for Botha campaign”). His appeal produced little change in the white birth rate, but observers reported that nonwhite attendance at family planning clinics dropped
sharply in the months following the statement (Caldwell, 1970). In 1962,
H.F. Verwoerd, in his oft-quoted speech at the granting of self-governance to
the Transkei, emphasized the demographic basis of apartheid (in ChimereDan, 1993: 32): “If the one multi-racial state were to become a federally
constituted state . . . or a unitary state [that is, one-person, one vote] and at
the same time be truly democratic and in harmony with the spirit of the
times, it would inexorably lead to Bantu domination. Because in the long
run numbers must tell.” In the context of increased national and international condemnation of apartheid policies, these public declarations of a numbers game by political leaders further stymied the government’s ambition to
implement a family planning program. However, political events of the 1960s
acted as a strong counterbalance to political sensitivity. The black consciousness movement had taken root, a new wave of black unrest swept over the
country in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, and the winds
of change were blowing through the rest of the continent, bringing a shift in
power from white colonial hands to black nationalist ones. Heightened white
fears of being swamped by blacks exerted pressure on the government to do
something about the situation that was thought to threaten the stability and
economic progress of the nation.
International events in population and family planning at that time provided a convenient legitimizing frame for South Africa’s reticent steps to-

12

ward implementing a national program. A number of articles and books on
imminent global doom appeared at this time, such as Paul Ehrlich’s The
Population Bomb (1968) and Georg Borgstrom’s The Hungry Planet (1965)
and demonstrated that the population explosion was not just a South African
problem, it was a world problem. Furthermore, as in other parts of the world,
the most explosively growing populations were nonwhite (see, for example,
South American Medical Journal, 1970). Foreboding population figures from
progovernment South African intellectuals were publicized widely in the
press, and the inadequacy of voluntary organizations to provide family planning services nationally was becoming increasingly evident (Sadie, 1970;
van Rensburg, 1972). International attention to population issues also legitimized national family planning programs and proffered examples on successful implementation (Harkavy, 1995; Sharpless, 1994), while results of
localized demographic studies in the late 1960s showed relatively high levels of demand among nonwhite urban women and indicated that a program
might be well received (Mostert and Engelbrecht, 1972; Mostert, 1972;
Mostert and van Eeden, 1972; and Mostert and du Plessis, 1972). On 1 February, 1974, at the opening of the parliamentary session, Prime Minister B.J.
Vorster announced at the end of his address that “the Government associates
itself with the idea of a World Population Year in 1974 and is accepting its
responsibility in this connection by developing a country-wide family-planning programme” (Hansard’s, 1974: 13).
The main developments and history of the family planning program
have been discussed elsewhere (Lucas, 1992; Caldwell and Caldwell, 1993;
Kaufman, 1996), and only a brief overview is provided here. The national
family planning program began as a single-purpose service, and, at an early

13

point, nurses were permitted to deliver services without physicians’ authorization (Stockton, 1990). The program underwent tremendous growth in the
number of clinics, trained personnel, and in resource allocation (Brown, 1987;
Lucas, 1992). In the 1992–93 fiscal year, for example, more than 65,000
service points were in operation, including all fixed and mobile clinic sites
(Department of Health, 1992). Although the program was vigorous and wellequipped, it went through a number of transformation, mainly to address or
to avoid criticism. The maneuvering, however, did not diminish the strong
demographic rationale that underpinned —and plagued — the program from
its inception (Kaufman, 1996).
In the early 1980s, the President’s Council commissioned an extensive
report on demographic trends in South Africa (Republic of South Africa,
1983). As a result of that report, the Population and Development Program
(PDP), the population policy arm of the government, was initiated in 1984
charged with the responsibility of popularizing the consequences of high
population growth in South Africa and promoting the small family ideal.
The objectives of the program, as outlined by the Minister of Health and
Welfare, were (1) to stabilize a population of 80 million by the end of the
next century; (2) to accelerate social and economic development in order to
achieve parity in the development levels of the different population groups
by the middle of the next century; (3) to achieve a total fertility rate of no
more than 2.1 children per woman of reproductive age and thus target the
sectors of the population growing fastest; and (4) to ensure an “orderly spatial distribution” of the population through coordinated involvement in health,
education, and economic programs, and urban and rural development schemes
(Hansard’s, 1984: 6,529; Department of Health, 1984). As the emissary for
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population policy of the apartheid government, however, the PDP did not
have the popular acceptance of the targeted communities. Also, it was not
vested with the authority to realize its objectives, in spite of the high profile
the government accorded it at its commencement. The inappropriate nature
of much of the educational work of the PDP, suspected links to security
forces, draconian demographic ideology, and an institutionalized powerlessness to effect development brought heavy and widespread criticism (van
Rensburg, 1994; Klugman, 1991, 1993 and 1994; see also van Zuydam, 1994,
for dissent within the PDP).
Ironically, the very populations meeting the definition of “targeted
communities” in need of family planning services (that is, low socioeconomic level, generally rural, with high fertility rates) were precisely those
out of reach: African women in the so-called homelands. Under the policy
of separate development, ethnic homelands would move toward independence from the white Republic of South Africa, and thus would have to
grapple with their own population pressures. Control over health services,
including family planning services, was a part of the plan for the independence for homelands. As various homelands declared themselves “territories,” they were granted self-governing rights within their borders, and responsibility for health services was duly handed over to them (Department
of Health, 1973 and 1975). Neither the family planning program nor the
PDP of the (white) Republic could provide services or conduct educational
activities in the homelands unless officially invited to do so. Although little
was known about exact fertility patterns in the homelands, the idea was
widely accepted that levels were high and, importantly, so was the demand
for services. To avoid compromising the “sovereign rights” of these areas,
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the program set up mobile clinic sites and services in places most easily
accessible to homeland women. Clinics sometimes provided services “across
the street” from homelands so that women could walk over the border, or
sometimes clinics were organized at shops frequented by black women when
they traveled to the Republic (little commercial activity transpired in homeland areas; market activity was another domain controlled under apartheid)
(Stockton, 1995).
The government’s family planning program, in tandem with the PDP,
served millions of women, most of them African, even in a hostile political
context. The services it provided undoubtedly facilitated declines in fertility
and increased contraceptive use, especially among blacks. However, the
implementation of the national family planning program did not initiate the
demand for reproductive control or even necessarily sustain it. Shifts in expectations of and opportunities for women that directly influenced the numbers of children they bore had begun well before the start of national family
planning. Once the program began, women made the decision to use contraceptives in spite of familial or community opposition, not solely because of
educational materials or accessibility of clinics, but because circumstances
in their lives compelled them to do so.
GENDER, RACE, AND REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL:
TRANSFORMATION AND TENSION
Mason (1987) asserts that fertility control cannot be considered a strictly
individual decision; it is a process that requires authority, and that authority
is socially derived. The locus of authority over women underwent a rapid
shift in the present century, a continuing process, but one that has been largely
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ignored until recently (Cock, 1988; Seidman, 1993). Research on women in
South Africa has tended to focus on the purposes women’s subordination
served for capitalism (Bozzoli, 1983). Indeed, this relationship has been well
documented, especially for migrant laborers and their families. Briefly, black
women were left on the reserves charged with the care of children and the
family’s sustenance. This arrangement enabled the capitalist establishment
to maintain a low-paid migrant labor force, because wages did not have to
provide for a whole family, and the reproductive and productive functions of
home subsidized the laborer who, therefore, required a smaller living wage
(see, especially, Wolpe, 1972). Focus on the relationship between capital
and gender, as argued by Bozzoli, deflected analysis of relations of power
and domination between men and women. Bozzoli’s point is particularly
salient to an examination of fertility control. The state apparatus designed to
control labor and African mobility and residence was a system that exerted
differential forces on the lives of men and women and their families. The
insertion of these policies into their lives, in combination with existent patterns of authority and control, have shaped the boundaries of decisionmaking concerning fertility.
The long history of migrant labor in South Africa has structured social relations at every level of society. Walker (1990: 169), writing on the
impact of the development of migrant labor on women, argues that this
labor system “open[ed] up opportunities for increased personal autonomy
and mobility at an individual level while radically undermining the security
previously accorded women in pre-colonial society.” As with segregation
policy, labor migration did not commence with apartheid, but was developed and extended at various junctures throughout South African history.
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The transformation in authority over women and their fertility were derived
in large part from the twists and turns of the expanding labor migration and
pass-law systems.
The streams of migrant labor shifted considerably in their demographic
composition over time. The early phase of migration, prior to the turn of the
century, generally was comprised of young men whose income provided a
flow of wealth to the homestead in the form of cattle, hoes, and guns. Women’s
work was central to homestead maintenance and was not significantly affected by the absence of young men. Productive and reproductive activities
of women and migrant youth were under the authority of traditional chiefs
and elders during this period who procured tributes from wage labor and
lobola (brideprice) payments (Walker, 1990). By 1930, the system of migrant labor had become a dominant force in the lives of all who lived in
South Africa, even in the rural periphery. By this time, however, the agricultural capacity of the reserves was no longer able to sustain its population,
and men of all ages and women were leaving the reserves, which constituted
an alarming threat to the authority (and income) of chiefs. The flow of Africans from the reserves also worried white administrators of the still nascent
migrant-labor system who seemed unable to channel appropriately the increased numbers of men leaving the reserves, and who viewed women’s
presence in urban areas as unnecessary and even dangerous. Chiefs and administrators collaborated in a variety of ways to control female mobility
(expressed as “rampant immorality”) using pass laws, restrictions to transport, and “repatriation” of “runaway” wives (Walker, 1990: 181).
The confluence and distortion of African and white forms of social
organization became increasingly evident. Men of both systems desired control over women. For African elders, this meant the continuation of brideprice
18

practices and female agricultural production. Colonials agreed that women
should stay in the reserves to preserve the “tribal way of life”; however,
administrators were far more concerned with the centrality of women’s contributions in subsidizing the wages of black workers. The cultural argument
they used glossed over deep contradictions imposed by the labor policy;
even while colonials were concerned with “tribal customs” in the control of
women, they were not concerned with the devastation the migrant-labor system caused to tribal life by the prolonged absences of men from their families and communities. Furthermore, in spite of the colonial concern with
tradition, the laws formalized at this time reflected obvious assumptions of a
conjugal family defined in western terms. Laws on adultery and divorce
figured prominently in new legislation, and marked the dilution of elders’
authority over women and a strengthening of husbands’ rights (Walker, 1990).
With the inauguration of the Nationalist Party in 1948, the government
pursued more repressive strategies to control Africans. Posel (1991) persuasively warns, however, that the policies formulated thereafter were not a part
of a grand design, but rather a product of internal state tensions and liaisons
and were essentially ambiguous and contradictory. The practical effects of
the implemented policies on the lives of the black population, however, were
not so ambiguous. Section 10 of the 1951 Native Laws Amendment Bill
stipulated that a native should not remain in an urban area for more than 72
hours unless he was born there or resided there for at least 15 years, has
worked continuously for one employer for ten years, or “unless such a native
is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under the age at which he would
become liable for the payment of general tax . . . . ” The gendered language
of the Bill is intentional. Conceding to widespread black protest, the legislators agreed not to require women to carry passes (Posel, 1991: 102).
19

In 1952, the year the Native Laws Bill was enacted, 164,324 blacks
were “endorsed out” of white urban areas on pass violations. The number
increased yearly thereafter, reaching an annual average of 541,500 during
the peak years of 1970–75 (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989: 206).6 To accomplish such a feat, the Native Affairs Department and the police and security
force underwent tremendous expansion. Large sums of money were dedicated to maintaining a growing police force and to upholding the bureaucratic structures necessary to process the many pass violations in accordance
with the law. The result was a daunting escalation of police harassment of
and interference with blacks, mostly men, in their daily lives. Random checks,
questioning, humiliation, and continual fear of their precarious status in the
cities became a part of everyday life.
The late 1950s saw an upsurge in African resistance to apartheid policies. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, by 1959 pass-law legislation
was extended to women. Also, Posel (1991) argues that the protests catalyzed a significant shift in ideology in the application of policy occurred.
Specifically, it was during this period that idea of separate development was
formalized, and much harsher categories of “nonproductive” labor were defined to facilitate relocation of Africans. They included:
[T]he aged, unfit, widows, women with dependent children and also
families who do not qualify under the provisions of the Bantu (Urban
Areas) Act . . . for family accommodation in the European urban areas
. . . professional Bantu such as doctors, attorneys, agents, traders, industrialists, etc. Such persons are not regarded as essential for the European labour market . . . . Normally they are well-to-do Bantu and by
settling these people with buying power in the homelands, a great con20

tribution can be made to the development of those territories (Posel,
1991: 234).
However, many Africans remained legally and illegally in the so-called
white areas of South Africa in townships and squatter areas in the hope of
better access to jobs, education, and social services. Others remained on
white farms and in other rural areas partly because semifeudal employment
practices kept them in these places (James, 1988).
The dramatic shift in content and the intensity of enforcement of pass
laws instituted by the National Party took a heavy toll economically and
socially on black women and men (Posel, 1991). Blacks in the urban areas
and townships who were held on some type of infraction were allowed to
pay an admission-of-guilt fine, often an unaffordable penalty for black workers
earning meager wages. The alternative to the fine was a jail sentence that
extended the period of absence of men from their families (and women as
well when they came under the law’s jurisdiction), placing an added burden
of providing for families on women (Posel, 1991). In the reserves, most
women by this time had become economically dependent upon remittances
from urban migrant labor for at least part of their subsistence. Workers “endorsed out” posed doubly debilitating burdens: They no longer contributed to
homestead income, and they further diluted scant resources upon their return to
the homeland household (Posel, 1991).
From women’s point of view, the migrant-labor system, predominated
by men, represented both opportunities and hardships. A woman left on a
reserve often assumed a great deal of economic and productive responsibility for the family in her husbands’ absence and was often less willing to
submit to her husbands’ wishes upon his return (Sharp and Spiegel, 1990).
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However, she had to contend with the uncertainty of his wages and the possibility that he might not return. Before the collapse of agricultural viability
in rural areas in the early part of this century, men sent money home as a type
of investment. With the deterioration of the reserve lands resulting from overworked soil and increased population, however, men were more likely to use
money for consumption, rather than investment, making male wages an even
less reliable economic resource (Moodie and Ndatshe, 1992). Abandoned
wives, landless women, or women otherwise escaping from an oppressive
domestic situation traveled to mine areas, often illegally, in the hope of reasserting rights to support from partners, attracting male liaisons to procure
improved living conditions, or to engage in beer-brewing, prostitution, or
other economic activities for which migrants provided a market. Other women
turned to nonmining urban areas to pursue what they felt had to be a more
promising life.
Thus far, South Africa’s “native” policies have been considered in terms
of their impact on the nature or locus of control over women’s fertility or on
the larger social and economic context within which fertility dynamics transpired. Although historical information is fragmentary, the evidence suggests that control over women fundamentally shifted from elders, to elders
under supervision of colonial powers, and finally to husbands. During the
1950s, however, a husband’s control over a woman’s sexuality and fertility
became much less clear and much less stable. Many have observed rise in
divorce, desertion, and extramarital relationships as a result of the stresses of
migrant labor (Longmore, 1959; WHO, 1983; Posel, 1991; Romero-Daza,
1994). As changes in patterns of marital union, family structures and economy
continued, a commensurate shift from men to women in responsibility for family building also occurred.
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Longmore (1959: 51–60), observing life in a Johannesburg township
from 1950–57, noted that “[urban males] were evading the responsibilities
of fatherhood by way of the loose union, irregularly formed giving rise to
the temporary family” and that it was not unusual for a woman to change
husbands frequently, and often while also providing care for two, three, and
four children. She also observed that women in urban settings no longer
adhered to the patriarchal authority of their former rural homes. She described them as wiser and more adept at negotiating with men to maintain
themselves and their children. Another source of insight into this changing
dynamic comes from Bozzoli and Nkotsoe (1991). Their book is a compilation of life histories collected from older women residing in Phokeng, a small
town in the Western Transvaal. The women’s remembrances of their family
lives in townships or urban areas of Johannesburg during the 1930s reveal
incipient changes in relationships between men and women. Bozzoli (1991:
134) asserts that women had already “shown willfulness and independence
from patriarchal control at home.” Constructing a household for themselves
and their children in the city was a central factor in targeting the employment sectors in which they would seek work, and sometimes in deciding
which relationships they would maintain. For example, one woman reported
that after the death of her first husband, she did not want to marry because
she could not be sure a new husband would support, or allow her to support,
her children: “If I had another husband, who would have paid for [the
children’s] schooling? I hated a man like a prison. I wanted to look after my
children.” Another woman sent her children back to her mother to rear, which
allowed her to work at slightly more lucrative jobs and to send money home
to her children. Other women withdrew from formal-sector jobs, preferring
the flexibility of informal work required for proper child care (Bozzoli and
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Nkotsoe, 1991). Having children and maintaining a home for them was central to women’s lives. Their ability to do so, however, was highly proscribed
by the forces of racially based employment and housing restrictions. Initially, in the circumstances of deteriorating economic possibilities in rural
areas and unreliable social and economic relationships with men, women
had little choice but to assert themselves within a system that offered them
few opportunities. Nonetheless, women increasingly were better prepared and
more willing to negotiate relationships and employment to suit their needs.
Opportunities and responsibilities were apportioned differentially to
black men and women in South Africa. The response to those differences
over time in the context of racially based labor and segregation policies of
South Africa comprised an integral component to the social process of fertility control. Women took increased responsibility for the number of children
they bore, and their decision to do so warrants further investigation. Before
turning to issues of reproductive control from the perspective of women,
however, the specific political context of family planning as a means of fertility control is discussed. Indeed, the opinions found in black communities
toward family planning, coupled with the heavy-handedness for which the
program was renowned, acted as a mediating force, an additional layer of
political and social assertion shaping women’s reproductive decisions.
USES AND ABUSES OF FAMILY PLANNING UNDER
APARTHEID
Black community leaders have been tremendously influential in mobilizing or suspending action among their constituencies on a wide variety
of issues. Their opinions about family planning had the potential of creating
a conducive or hostile environment for reproductive decisionmaking. Such
24

leaders have almost always been male. The complexity of gender relations
in South Africa, varying considerably across regions and in urban and rural
settings and coupled with high levels of censorship in a repressive system,
makes a detailed assessment of family planning at the community level difficult. Media reports, however, indicate a high level of hostility to family
planning, both because of the political numbers game implied by the program, and because many saw fertility control as an affront to (male) authority and counter to the African way of life. Relatively little expression was
given to concern for the health or well-being of women and their children or
for the role of men in the maintenance of their families.
In 1982, for example, the African Communist, a paper issued from
London by the South African Communist Party, ran an article entitled “Family planning in South Africa — a kind of genocide” :
The so-called national family planning programme is being used to
perpetuate White domination and the oppression and exploitation of
the Black majority. . . . In the South African context family planning
tramples on rights of the oppressed Black majority and the hostility
with which the oppressed majority have reacted to this policy is a direct result of the historical experience of racist White minority rule
which has systematically robbed them of the land and the liberty and is
now intent on restricting their right to reproduce themselves. The
people’s rejection of population control is part of their strategy for
self-preservation. (Hansard’s, 1983: 283–284).
In 1988, Stephen Sihebe, the KwaZulu minister of welfare and pensions, stated that every extra African child was a boost for freedom, and that
even if big families had to do without the bare necessities of life, in the name
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of the liberation struggle, sacrifices must be made (SAIRR, 1988). The effect of such exhortations are unknown. In Cape Town in 1985, a noticeable,
albeit temporary, drop in clinic attendance occurred subsequent to one political call for more black children (Cape Times, 1985), and in Port Elizabeth
in 1986, clinics were forced to close because of threats and intimidation
(Weekend Post, 1986). However, the political call for “freedom babies,”
“people’s rejection of population control,” or a statement criticizing the 1983
report on demographics on the basis that “it is against the culture of black
people to have fewer children” (Hansard’s, 1983: 623) seemed to have more
to do with political positioning than with the constraints of women’s lives.
Male political leaders may not have acknowledged the risks or benefits of
family planning to women, but women in leadership positions in the black
community also voiced concerns with the racial motivations of the program.
In 1987, the director of community affairs for the Urban Foundation, Deborah
Mabietsa, claimed that the government was using birth control to ensure
white control (SAIRR, 1988), and Sister Bernard Ncube, president of the
Federation of Transvaal Women, stated that contraception is a “safe way of
murdering a nation” (The Star, 1986), a sentiment seconded by Regina Nzo,
a leading figure in the African Natural Congress Women’s League (Weekend
Mail, 1990). Evaluating these statements in the context of a struggle to end
apartheid sheds some light on the seeming insensitivity to women’s needs.
Family planning was a white-controlled program and thus a political target.
Several controversies surrounding the family planning program did
not work to allay community suspicion. Depo-Provera, a long-lasting injectable contraceptive produced by the Upjohn company, was a major focus of
criticism. A hormone-regulating drug that came to South Africa in the late
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1960s, Depo-Provera was received with enthusiasm by physicians (Tyler,
1968; Karstadt, 1970; Ferguson, 1974). The convenience of the injection as
a contraceptive method that lasted for up to three months at a time was recognized by the administrators of the family planning program. Mobile-clinic
schedules were organized around a three-month cycle to accommodate the
term of the injection effects. Striking differences in contraceptive methoduse patterns by race quickly appeared. In the late 1980s, the injection was
the method administered to more than 50 percent of all black users and 40
percent of colored users, while the pill and sterilization predominated among
Indian and white users (Figure 5). However, the degree to which black and
colored women, especially in rural areas, had a choice of methods presented
to them was questionable (see also Chimere-Dan, 1993). With the Federal
Drug Administration’s ban on use of the drug in the United States, many

Figure 5 Contraceptive method use by race, South Africa, 1987–89
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critics of the program accused the family planning program of subjecting
nonwhite South African women to dangerous chemicals to achieve demographic objectives. Dr. Elin Hammar, a spokesperson for the Family Planning Association and a physician highly committed to and involved with
nurses’ training for the national program, stated in 1980 that the charges
against Depo-Provera were grossly exaggerated, and that tests on monkeys
and dogs that had resulted in their developing cancer, with some monkeys
suffering shrinking uteruses, indicated low tolerance levels in the animals,
and that, therefore, the results were not applicable to women. She denied
that the injectable caused cancer of the cervix and stated that it was caused
by the early onset of sexual activity or by activity with multiple sexual partners (SAIRR, 1980; see also Domisse, 1987). The controversy over DepoProvera, however, did not greatly alter the level of its use, in part because the
national program did not cancel or limit the use of the method, but also
because women preferred it. The injectable was a long-lasting form of fertility control that did not require consent or cooperation of a woman’s partner
(or her in-laws). For women who could not travel to clinics often and who
feared the disapproval of their partners in their decision to avoid pregnancy,
the injectable contraceptive was an ideal choice. Indeed, many women were
willing to withstand uncomfortable side effects of the drug for the security
of effective birth control (Gready et al., 1994; Kaufman, 1994).
The desire to avoid pregnancy often arose to facilitate employment.
Employment opportunities were limited for black South African women and
most positions were not amenable to the inconveniences of childbearing or
child care. As one worker commented (Barrett et al., 1985: 142): “If someone knows you are pregnant, they will run to the nursing sister and tell her so
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that you are fired, and they know someone who can take your place.” Contraceptive use became in many instances a pre-condition for hire and for
continued employment. Though usually not made explicit, the Federation of
South African Trade Unions (Women Workers) did bring one such agreement to the attention of the public (Barrett et al., 1985: 172).
__________Company, Ltd.
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I am currently not pregnant. I
further more agree that should I fall pregnant in the next twelve months,
my service could be terminated immediately.
Signature
Pregnant women had no guarantee of a job after the birth of a child and
were also susceptible to influx-control laws under which they would be judged
unproductive and sent to the appropriate homeland. The fear of employment
loss and the economic desperation that caring for another child stirred in
women should not be underestimated.7 A manager described one outcome
(Barrett et al., 1985: 142): “In a place where I worked before, a woman who
was pregnant wrapped her stomach tightly so no one would know she was
pregnant because she was afraid of losing her job. This made her abort.”
Another widespread practice known as the “fourth stage of labor,” involved
administering an injection immediately postpartum (Klugman, 1993; Stockton, 1995). The rationale for this practice is unknown, because women are
usually anovulatory for several months after delivery. Nonetheless, nurses
usually provided the injection as a matter of procedure. Permission from the
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patient was not sought generally, although sometimes the patient received
the explanation that “the baby will be healthier” (Mamosadi, 1995). One
young woman described her experience (Klugman, 1988: 102): “I used it
after delivering my baby. I was taken there and given an injection without
being told anything. They only took my blood pressure and gave me the next
date for a checkup.”
In spite of reported abuses in family planning service provision, community leaders by no means agreed about the disadvantages of family planning for blacks. Neto Motlana, a prominent civic leader in Soweto and personal physician to Nelson Mandela, has held strongly favorable opinions
about family planning; Mandla Tshabalala, an influential professor at the
University of Cape Town organized population forums and coordinated commissions concerned with population issues and has supported family planning even while criticizing the government program (Tshabalala, 1991); and
Bishop Desmond Tutu has appeared in promotional advertisements for family planning (Brown, 1987). The 20 October 1990 issue of Cape Times reported results from a study on attitudes toward family planning that were
indicative of the role community politics played in fertility control in general and gender relations in particular. The study showed that almost half of
the black people in South Africa’s major metropolitan areas believed that
family planning was a government plot to reduce the black population. However, 59 percent of women felt that even if their men were opposed, they
would practice birth control anyway. These women, although cognizant of
the pressures, expectations, and opinions of important members of their communities, including their partners, felt strongly enough to disregard opinions
contrary to their own (Cape Times, 1990).
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EVERYDAY CONSTRAINTS ON REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL FOR
BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN WOMEN
The last few decades have witnessed a dramatic decline in fertility
levels in the black population of South Africa. Many African societies have
prescribed behaviors that inhibit fertility, including prolonged breastfeeding
and abstinence after childbirth, practices that still can be found throughout
the continent (see, for example, Bongaarts et al., 1984). However, the presumption is that these behaviors are, by themselves, not sufficient to produce a sustained decline in fertility. In South Africa, the efforts of the vigorous and well-funded family planning program greatly facilitated the
availability of modern contraceptives, but availability of effective methods
is not enough. Couples must not only understand that they can control their
fertility, but also that doing so benefits them. The structure of state-controlled labor patterns, residential policies, and the general incompatibility of
women’s employment and childbearing and rearing imparted a particular
meaning to the phrase “benefits of smaller families.” However, a benefit
might also be compromised by the opinions and pressures of partners, elders, or in-laws. This section evaluates the constraints on fertility control
from women’s perspective and discusses how they have interpreted and acted
upon having reproductive choice in their daily lives.
In 1993–94, the Women’s Health Project (WHP)8 organized a series of
focus groups to explore women’s attitudes toward contraceptives, reproductive decisionmaking, and their experiences with family planning services
(Gready et al., 1994). The following overview draws largely from WHP’s
focus-group materials; from oral history transcripts of the Killie Campbell
Africana Library in Durban; from the Women in Phokeng oral history project
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of the Institute of Advanced Social Research, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg; and from in-depth interviews conducted by the author in 1994
with African women throughout the former Transvaal province.9
The reasons women give for having children, and the reasons for having more children, demonstrate the range of reproductive control they have.
Some women believe they have no place in making fertility decisions, others show an emergent self-confidence, and still others radiate an obvious
sense of control and power over reproduction. The attitudes of men are central in accounting for these variations. Women talk a great deal about their
partner’s wanting children or not wanting children. The power of men in
reproductive decisionmaking, however, is often discussed in terms of a mediating force. No matter what men want, the reality of life for an African
woman in South Africa may well demand something else:
Oh men, they are still thinking in those old days, when, well, if God
says you must have so many children, leave it to God. They seem to
forget now that things are changing, on the other hand . . . . Here in the
town they seem to forget that everything is money. If you have many
children and you are getting pay in town, how are you going to support
these children? . . . So now the fathers, why don’t they realise all these
things? So that now let me have about two children, of which I’m going to
be able to educate, and feed properly, such things. (kcav: 145, 1979).10
This woman, a leader in the Inkatha Women’s League (at that time an
organization to promote the culture of the Zulus), was most likely more educated and opinionated about fertility control than many other women. The
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sentiment was a common one, however, as another woman expressed (WHP,
working class)11: “We black people have a big problem because we are expected to be under the control of our husbands, they should control even the
way we get children. What if his control is not correct?”
Beyond the immediate desire of their partners (discussed in more detail below), women’s stated reasons for wanting or not wanting more children are indicative of the constraints they face. Most women who want more
children give general reasons: “happiness,” “joy,” or an indication that having children sanctions their roles as women, that is, as mothers. Material
reasons center on security in old age, a function of children in black families
that is integral in a system that has limited state support for the elderly.12
Although parents rely on children to provide for them in old age, the relationship often spans several generations, a direct result of conditions for the
employment of women in South Africa. In many cases, children are sent to
their grandmothers while their mothers work, a pattern that has gone on for
some time:
After [my husband’s] death [in 1946] . . . I decided to leave for
Johannesburg to go and work there. I had no house of my own and my
children were still young, the only alternative which I had was to leave
them behind with my mother-in-law and go work in Johannesburg.
(Phokeng: 26)13
Grandmothers take care of their children’s children, but the relationship is reciprocal; grandchildren care for their elders and act as a conduit for
money and other goods:
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I am looking after my grandchildren. I am helping my children. When
one bears a child she brings the child to live with me.
Do (the parents) pay you?
We did not agree on payment, but they gave me R20 per month. We
did not say I am paying you for your job. It was a gift. (Phokeng: 17)
Are you not aware that it is through these grandchildren that I am able
to get food from my child (the mother of these children)? Her husband
would not have allowed her to send her mother food otherwise.
(Phokeng: 22)
This next quote from a “grannie” not only expresses the important role
children and grandchildren play, but acknowledges the hardship that a formal marriage might bring to a woman:
The way marriage has turned out to be. If your child is a lady teacher,
let her get a child and bring it home. You will look after it. Tomorrow
she gets another and brings it home. Because these children will look
after you. Rather than have a husband who will fight every day. You
won’t have problems . . . . (Phokeng: 17)
Dependence on children in old age means having enough of them so
that some will survive. Women in the former Transvaal province, in rural
and urban communities alike, commonly expressed a desire to have many
children because their mothers had so many children who died, or their sisters, or their neighbors. One woman described her concern to have many
children because her mother was able to have so few; she wanted to “close
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the gap” (Kaufman, 1994). An awareness of the fragility of life with its implications for fertility was clear in the statements made by these women.
The most common reason given by women in the former Transvaal
who did not want more children was economic circumstances, whereas
younger respondents indicated that they wanted to delay childbearing until
they completed their education. As the member of the Inkatha Women’s
League noted above, even in 1979, the cost of living was an immense problem. Women in the Transvaal repeatedly supported their fertility decisions
on an economic basis: They had no money, their partners did not have jobs,
they were already living with their parents. In short, children cost money
that they didn’t have. One woman in the former Natal province, describing
this economic hardship, indicated that the child’s father felt no compulsion
to contribute economically:
In my case, what caused me to leave school was that I bore a child and
had to go and find work. When I had the child I was not married,
staying at home, and still attending school. Bringing up the child naturally involved considerable extra expense, but added to this was the
fact the father and I had quarreled since he was not prepared to provide
for it. (kcav:188, 1981)
Although this woman had to leave school, she described how she went
through a series of jobs, and from each she learned skills that improved her
condition of employment in the next job. Finally, she became a fully licensed
driver, a rare event for an African woman at this time, which made possible
a stable and relatively good income. Work for this woman was essential to
provide for her child.14 Employment loss because of childbearing meant not
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only a loss of income for women, but increased expenditures to care for
another child, further proscribing women’s choices. This woman addressed
this reality: “A girl can have the misfortune to have to leave home because
she has borne a child. She leaves home to go and find work, then she will
perhaps find a lover to take care of her and will often end up having a second
child. And so her troubles continue unabated.” By implicit contrast, she sees
herself as a success: She did not need a lover to provide for her; she did not
become pregnant again.
The role of men is central in reproductive decisionmaking dynamics.
Sometimes, joint decisions are possible. Often, however, women feel that
avoiding pregnancy is left to them alone in the face of unrealistic expectations of their partners: “[The men] say they want more children, they don’t
care, ten . . . they don’t care . . . . They will say . . . I want children . . . . You
see, they don’t care whether [their wives] are suffering, you see, but they
want children” (kcav:174, 1979). And some believe that a woman should
take care of her own fertility: “Often women are the ones who control this
because they are able to prevent pregnancy if they don’t want to have children . . . . Even if our men want to have children, if we are not prepared to do
so, then there is nothing they can do” (WHP: informal settlement). Women
of all ages have commented, either from personal experience or through
observation, that increasingly, boyfriends are placing pressure on their girlfriends to bear them children.
I’ve been seeing my boyfriend for five years. Unfortunately, the first
year we started seeing each other I didn’t know anything about contraceptives . . . so I fell pregnant and basically he’d been encouraging me
to do so, but I didn’t tell him I was pregnant. I had an abortion . . . . And
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he’s been pestering me since . . .

saying look, five years is just too

much (not to have any children) (WHP, returnees).
Sometimes pressure is applied in the form of a promise of marriage;
the woman need only prove her fertility first. Sometimes, and this condition
seems more common, a man will ask his girlfriend for a child as proof of her
love and commitment: “I have heard many women saying that if you want a
man to stay with you for a long time, you must have a child with him. Have
as many children as possible” (WHP, informal settlement). The use of contraceptives, conversely, implies that she does not trust him, or that she has
other boyfriends. Pressures such as these are felt acutely by younger women,
although they do not completely disappear with age (Parekh and de la Rey,
1995; Kaufman, 1994). In extreme cases, reproductive tension between partners results in physical abuse, especially because reproduction is considered
central proof of masculinity (Motsei, 1995a). This portrayal of South African men, however, should be tempered by the fact that virtually all information available on men and their views about contraception is derived from
reports from women. Smit and Venter (1991) found that in KwaZulu/Natal,
83 percent of women and 72 percent of men approved of contraception, although 65 percent of the women believed that men disapproved. As yet,
little information exists on men’s attitudes beyond this study. Klugman (1993)
speculated that part of the ambivalence women feel toward contraception may
be rooted less in its use per se than in their perception that their partners will
disapprove.
Economic conditions, employment opportunities, and concern for the
health and welfare of their families within the context of a racialized society
motivated black South African women to use contraceptives in spite of im37

mense pressure, real or assumed, to do otherwise. Although they may be
applauded for their ability to seek out reproductive control under formidable
conditions, the restricted choice women have had in South African society
demands a critical approach to future issues of reproductive health.
POPULATION POLICY AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN
SOUTH AFRICA, 1994 AND BEYOND
The legacy of population policy under apartheid has left an ideological minefield and an administrative nightmare in its wake. Mirroring the
anxiety of many whites toward a black-led government, the period prior to
the 1994 elections saw an increase in popular news reports and public discussion on the consequences of rampant population growth (for example,
Sunday Times, 1994; Weekend Star, 1994). Most of these reports were notable in that they lacked comment from major political parties. No political
contender wished to commit himself or herself to a position on this sensitive
issue. Indeed, the concerns with population abated after the elections because national attention shifted to the immediate issues of reorganization,
integration, amnesty, housing, and land reform. Women’s rights, reproductive health, and family planning were seen as politically intractable issues
the new administration would rather avoid. Women’s health services were
barely mentioned in either the Reconstruction and Development Plan (ANC,
1994b), or the National Health Plan for South Africa (ANC, 1994a). However, women’s groups have had a history of successful activism in South
Africa (Seidman, 1993), and largely as a result of the efforts of a number of
well-organized groups and highly motivated individuals, women’s reproductive health concerns ultimately were pushed onto the agenda of the new
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administration. This process was aided considerably by the events leading
up to and following the 1994 International Conference on Population and
Development in Cairo. South Africa was re-entering the international community, and this event, following almost immediately after the elections,
consumed a considerable amount of media coverage. Moreover, the agenda of
reproductive health and reproductive rights, predominating themes of the conference, resonated with almost complete consonance with the framework South
African groups had been pushing at home. The momentum of action was furthered by the United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.
In spite of sustained efforts at the political level, the transformation of
service delivery has been slower then many had hoped, and overcoming
obstacles left from the previous regime will take time. However, racial politics surrounding family planning appear to be subsiding as services are integrated into the broader framework of reproductive health services (WHP,
1995 and 1996). Perhaps one of the most important changes since 1994,
certainly a very controversial one, has been the legalization of abortion. The
Termination of Pregnancy Act was passed in November 1996, and legal abortion services began on 1 February 1997. The issue of abortion remains contentious in South Africa, and the ability of advocacy groups to maintain its
legal status, and the capacity of the Department of Health to ensure safe and
accessible services, are unclear. Nonetheless, the effective organizing by
various women’s groups and health associations to lobby successfully for
legal abortion in a conservative society suggests that South Africa has the
capacity, underpinned by international support, to change legislative and
organizational structures rapidly, even if implementation at the local level is
much slower.
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Population policy issues have also moved forward, although their ties
to the reproductive health agenda are tenuous, perhaps by design. An article
on population control published in the Weekend Mail before the elections
(October 5–11, 1990: 3) concluded with a statement from Desiree Daniels,
an education officer for the Transport and General Workers Union: “I do
think that a post-apartheid government should have a policy in this area, but
it should come from the ground. If it emanates from the leadership it may
have no effect on the ground.” After the 1994 Cairo Conference, this is exactly what happened: A Green Paper outlining the population issues of the
country solicited the public for opinions, thoughts, and ideas about whether
South Africa should have a population policy, and if so, what form that population policy should take (Ministry for Welfare and Population Development, 1995). The draft of the White Paper on population policy, which incorporated the responses to the Green Paper, is currently under review (Republic
of South Africa, 1996).
Most observers see the developments in both these areas, reproductive
health and population policy, as positive signs of change even if they do not
agree with the direction. Few, however, have addressed the continuing tension between promoting comprehensive reproductive health and reproductive rights from a feminist perspective and addressing the implications of
demographic trends and population growth, issues which, in South Africa,
have been framed historically in antifeminist terms. As Tsui (in Harkavy,
1995: 245) points out, “No exacting set of research findings exists to underwrite the expectations that improved reproductive and sexual health will
prompt couples to exercise their reproductive choice in a manner that maintains fertility decline, and thereby slows population growth.” Perhaps the
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creativity fostered by the enthusiasm for reproductive health in South Africa
will produce a framework for a population policy that addresses demographic
dynamics in a manner congruous with women’s empowerment.
CONCLUSIONS
Caldwell and Caldwell (1993) may be correct that black South African
fertility was not as low as the country’s level of development would suggest.
However, the declines achieved were remarkable both in absolute terms,
fertility levels were lower than in any other country in sub-Saharan Africa
by estimates of the late 1980s, and because they occurred in the midst of
adverse conditions. This paper has sketched the context of that adversity in
three different arenas: the national politics of population; the transformation
of gender relations within a racially discriminatory society; and the proscriptions of everyday life for African women. The history of population issues,
long rooted in racially based demographic trajectories, produced a climate
of suspicion and hostility surrounding reproductive control, even before the
national family planning program came into being. Services, once started,
however, were, at best, unevenly received across communities, placing additional political constraints on accessibility. The decline in fertility for African women was no doubt aided considerably by the well-resourced national
program. However, the larger context of racial domination in the form of
homeland policies, labor migration, and discrimination placed a great deal
of strain on the social and economic relationships of women, men, and their
families, with direct implications for childbearing and rearing. Women came
to manage their own fertility as they increasingly found themselves in precarious financial and social circumstances. In choosing to do so, however,
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they often had to endure community or familial censure, or seek services
surreptitiously.
The constraints shaping women’s desire or ability to have fewer children have not disappeared with the advent of democracy in South Africa;
many of the dynamics outlined here continue to operate on fertility decisionmaking. Clearly, many questions about family-building in South Africa remain, including men’s roles in fertility control, shifting patterns of adolescent childbearing, and intergenerational or other kinship structures of
childrearing. Identifying those dynamics and the way they have come to
shape the South African fertility decline will contribute greatly to a broader
understanding of fertility dynamics in the region.

Notes
1.

Under apartheid, all South Africans were officially categorized as white,
colored (of mixed heritage), Indian (or Asian) or black (or African).
These classifications were legally sanctioned by the South African government and have been used throughout official statistics and much
research on South Africa. Because of this and because persons were
indeed treated in a particular way socially, legally, and economically
on the basis of their racial status, these terms are also used in this
manuscript. I use “African” and “black” interchangeably to refer to
the indigenous population.

2.

Family planning measures are taken from annual reports of the Department of Health. Contraceptive use rates and total fertility rates are
taken from the 1987–89 South African Demographic and Health Sur-
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vey, conducted by the South African Human Sciences Research Council. See Kaufman (1997) for an assessment of the quality of these data.
3.

In fact, 13 percent represented a slight improvement over the 10 percent set aside in the 1913 Natives Land Act. To “compensate” for the
increase in African land, the Representation of Natives Act of 1936
stripped the franchise from Africans in the Cape, the last vestige of
limited African voting rights.

4.

Four homelands, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei, eventually became so-called independent states with sovereign rights. The
remaining six, KwaZulu, KwaNdebele, QwaQwa, KaNgwane,
Gazankulu, and Lebowa, refused to opt for “independence” and remained a part of the Republic of South Africa, but with some selfgoverning rights within their borders. Political rights were conferred
to the “homelands” under the oversight of the South African government.

5.

Census data are of dubious quality in South Africa. The information
on these graphs are used to convey trends and not exact estimates.

6.

Pass laws were abolished in 1986.

7.

These factors contributed significantly to a high estimated rate of illegal abortion. Abortions had been illegal in South Africa except in narrowly defined circumstances. Approximately 36,000 women suffering from the effects of an illegal abortion are treated in hospitals
annually, and at least 100 women die from complications of abortions
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each year (Walker, 1994?). On 12 November 1996, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act was signed into law which provides for
abortion on request up to the twelfth week of pregnancy and conditionally thereafter (The Star, 1996).
8.

The Women’s Health Project is a nongovernmental organization affiliated with the Centre for Health Policy, University of Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg.

9.

These interviews were conducted in a variety of locations and settings
including fixed and mobile clinic sites, white-owned farms, townships,
and city centers in what are now Gauteng, Northern, and Mpumalanga
provinces. The sample was not selected to be representative of the
larger population, but to capture a wide variety of perspectives and
opinions on fertility issues among black South African women.

10.

Refers to tape number and year of interview of the oral history transcript in the Killie Campbell Africana collection (kcav).

11.

Refers to Women’s Health Project focus-group interviews and group
context.

12.

Pensions play a crucial role in South African society, especially among
Africans. Though the income is meager, increasing poverty has given
rise to situations in which a grandmother’s pension provides the sole
income for an entire household.

13.

Refers to interview number of the Women of Phokeng oral history
project.
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14.

In contrast to this case, and unlike many other settings in sub-Saharan
Africa, adolescent childbirth does not necessarily result in permanent
school-leaving. Girls in South Africa, especially in urban areas, often
continue their education after giving birth (Preston-Whyte et al., 1990;
Parekh and de la Rey, 1995).
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